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Abstract. Efficient certificateless one-pass session key establishment protocols
can be constructed from key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) by making use
of tags and signcryption schemes. The resulting primitives are referred to as Cer-
tificateless Signcryption Tag Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (CLSC-TKEMs).
In this paper we propose two novel CLSC-TKEM protocols, the first, named
LSW-CLSC-TKEM, makes use of the signature scheme of Liu et al., the sec-
ond, named DKTUTS-CLSC-TKEM, is based on the direct key transport using
a timestamp (DKTUTS) protocol first described by Zheng. In order to achieve
greater efficiency both schemes are instantiated on elliptic curves without mak-
ing use of pairings and are therefore good candidates for deployment on resource
constrained devices.
1 Introduction
Certificateless cryptography (CLC), introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [1], does not
require a public-key infrastructure (PKI) for digital certificate management and does
not suffer from the inherent key escrow feature of identity-based cyptography (IBC).
A certificateless scheme continues to make use of a trusted third party known as the
key generating center (KGC) which, as opposed to IBC, does not have access to the
user’s private key. In the CLC setting user private keys are constructed from two partial
secrets: one generated by the KGC computed from the user’s identity and a secret master
key and a secret value chosen by the user itself. The scheme is not identity-based,
because the public key is no longer exclusively computable from a user’s identity. When
Alice wants to send a message to Bob using a certificateless scheme, she must obtain
Bob’s public key. However, no authentication of Bob’s public key is necessary and no
certificate is required (as normally would be the case with a PKI).
The generation of a cryptographic secret key and its encryption with a public key
encryption scheme is generally known as key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Fur-
ther encrypting a message with the secret key and a symmetric key encryption scheme
is known as a data encryption mechanism (DEM). In general, the resulting KEM-DEM
schemes combine advantages of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic tech-
niques thus giving rise to secure and efficient hybrid public key encryption schemes
[2,3]. Efficient one-pass session key establishment protocols [4] can be constructed
based on KEMs by making use of tags [5] and signcryption schemes [6] appropriately
instantiated in the CLC setting. The resulting primitives are referred to as Certificateless
Signcryption Tag Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (CLSC-TKEMs). The use of a sign-
cryption scheme implies additional important security properties such as user (sender)
non-repudiation which are derived from the use of a digital signature scheme.
In this paper we propose two CLSC-TKEM protocols, the first, named LSW-CLSC-
TKEM, makes use of the signature scheme of Liu et al. [7], the second, named DKTUTS-
CLSC-TKEM, is based on the direct key transport using a timestamp (DKTUTS) proto-
col described in [8]. In order to achieve greater efficiency both schemes can be instanti-
ated on elliptic curves without making use of pairings and are therefore ideal candidates
for deployment on resource constrained devices.
2 Related work
In recent work, Jongho Won et al. [9] proposed an efficient CLSC-TKEM protocol
(eCLSC-TKEM) for securing communications between drones and smart objects. Ac-
cording to the authors, the protocol supports authenticated key agreement, non-repudiation,
and user revocation and significantly reduces the time required to establish a shared key
between a drone and a smart object by minimizing the computational overhead on the
smart object (since the protocol does not make use of pairings). A problem with this
protocol is possibly due to the user revocation technique introduced by the authors
which allows expiration of user partial private keys and therefore requires subsequent
reissue of a key and distribution to the user by the KGC. Much like the aforementioned
protocol, the CLSC-TKEM scheme of Seo et al.[10] is also inefficient from the compu-
tational perspective if the target recipient is a low-power resource-limited device.
In [11] the authors propose a generic architecture for a CLSC-TKEM that is based
on a true random number generator (TRNG) to produce secure cryptographic secret
keys for a KEM/DEM scheme.
3 Theoretical Framework for Certificateless Signcryption
Tag-KEMs
We refer to the framework of Signcryption Tag-KEMs (SC-TKEM) introduced by Bjorstad
and Dent [12] and extend it to the CLC setting. A CLSC-TKEM is defined as the tuple
of six algorithms described below:
1. Setup: A probabilistic common parameter generation algorithm that takes as input
a security parameter 1k and returns all the global system parameters Ω needed by
users of the scheme, such as choice of groups or hash functions. The algorithm also
outputs the private/public key pair (skKGC , pkKGC) of the KGC.
2. PartialPrivateKeyExtract: A probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes as
input the identity IDE of a generic entity E, Ω and outputs the partial private key
dE of E. This algorithm is generally run by the KGC which must thereafter deliver
the partial private key dE to E through a secure channel.
3. GenUserKeys: A probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes as input Ω and
generates the private/public key pair (xE , PE ) of entity E. Entity E sets skE =
(xE , dE) as its full private key.
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4. SymmetricKeyGen: A probabilistic symmetric key generation algorithm that takes
as input the public key pkB of the recipient entity B and outputs the symmetric key
K and internal state information ω.
5. Encapsulation: A probabilistic key encapsulation algorithm that receives as input
the state information ω, an arbitrary tag τ , the full private key skA of the sender A
and returns an encapsulation φ.
6. Decapsulation: A deterministic decapsulation/verification algorithm that takes as
input the public key pkA of the sender A, the full private key skB of the recipient,
an encapsulation φ and a tag τ and returns either the symmetric keyK or the unique
error symbol ⊥.
For the CLSC-TKEM to be sound, the decapsulation/verification algorithm must
return the correct key K whenever the encapsulation φ is correctly formed and the
corresponding keys and tag are supplied.
4 The LSW-CLSC-TKEM protocol specification
The LSW-CLSC-TKEM protocol, based on the signature scheme of Liu et al. [7], is
completely specified by the six polynomial time algorithms specified below:
1. Setup: On input the security parameter k ∈ Z+, the KGC returns the system pa-
rameters Ω (see below) and the KGC’s master private key xmsk . The KGC also
performs the following steps:
– Chooses a k-bit prime q, generates a cyclic additive group G, a cyclic multi-
plicative groupG2 both of order q and defines the tuple 〈Fq, E/Fq, G,G2, P 〉,
with P generator of G.
– Chooses the master key xmsk ∈R Z∗q uniformly at random and computes the
system public key Ppub = xmskP .
– Chooses the cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G → Z∗q , H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗;
– Publishes the global system parametersΩ = 〈Fq , E/Fq, G,G2, P, Ppub, H1, H2〉.
2. PartialPrivateKeyExtract: For entity A, with identity IDA, the KGC chooses
rA ∈R Z
∗
q computesRA = rAP , hA = H1(IDA, RA), dA = rA+xmskhA mod q
and delivers the partial private key dA to user IDA through a secret channel. Entity
A can validate her key by verifying that dAP = RA + hAPpub.
3. GenUserKeys: Entity A with an identity IDA chooses xA ∈R Z∗q as its secret
value and generates the corresponding public key PA = xAP . Furthermore, entity
A sets skA = (xA, dA) as its full private key and pkA = (PA, RA) as its full public
key.
4. SymmetricKeyGen: Given the sender identity IDA, the receiver identity IDB and
the full public key pkB as inputs, entity A (the sender) proceeds as follows:
– Chooses uA ∈R Z∗q and computes U = uA(RB +H1(IDB, RB)Ppub + PB);
– Computes X = uAP and K = H1(X,U, IDA, IDB);
– Outputs K and ω = (uA, IDA, skA, IDB, pkB, X, U).
5. Encapsulation: On input ω, an arbitrary tag τ , the full private key skA, entity A
obtains the encapsulation φ by performing the following operations:
– Selects a ∈R Z∗q and computes Q = aP ;
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– Computes h = H2(τ, IDA, IDB, RA, RB , PA, PB, Q,X,U);
– Computes s = a/(hxA + dA);
– Sets σ = (s, h) and outputs φ = 〈Q,U, σ〉.
6. Decapsulation: On input the encapsulation φ, tag τ , the sender’s identity IDA,
full public key pkA, the receiver’s identity IDB and the full private key skB , the
recipient entity B performs the following operations:
– Computes (dB + xB)−1 · U = uAP = X ;
– Computes h = H2(τ, IDA, IDB, RA, RB , PA, PB, Q,X,U);
– If s(hPA + RA +H1(IDA, RA)Ppub) 6= Q, returns with an invalid encapsu-
lation error ⊥;
– Otherwise, accepts the key K = H1(X,U, IDA, IDB).
The correctness of the protocol is determined as follows:
s(hPA +RA +H1(IDA, RA)Ppub) = a(hxA + dA)
−1(hPA +RA + hAPpub)
= a(hxA + dA)
−1(hxAP + rAP + hAxP )
= a(hxA + dA)
−1(hxA + rA + hAx)P
= a(hxA + dA)
−1(hxA + dA)P
= aP = Q
5 The DKTUTS-CLSC-TKEM protocol specification
The DKTUTS-CLSC-TKEM protocol, based on the direct key transport using a times-
tamp (DKTUTS) protocol described in [8], is completely specified by the six polyno-
mial time algorithms specified below:
1. Setup: On input the security parameter k ∈ Z+, the KGC returns two system
parameters: Ω and the KGC’s master private key xmsk. The KGC also performs
the following steps:
– Chooses a k-bit prime q, generates a cyclic additive group G, a cyclic multi-
plicative groupG2 both of order q and determines the tuple 〈Fq , E/Fq, G,G2, P 〉,
with P generator of G.
– Chooses the master key xmsk ∈R Zq∗ uniformly at random and computes the
system public key Ppub = xmskP .
– Chooses the cryptographic hash functionsH1 : {0, 1}∗×G→ Z∗q , H2 : Z∗q →
{0, 1}∗ and a keyed hash function FK : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗;
– Chooses the symmetric encryption scheme (EK(·), DK(·));
– Publishes the global system parametersΩ = 〈Fq , E/Fq, G,G2, P, Ppub, H1, H2,KH,E,D〉.
2. PartialPrivateKeyExtract: For entity A, with identity IDA, the KGC chooses
rA ∈R Z
∗
q computesRA = rAP , hA = H1(IDA, RA), dA = rA+xmskhA mod q
and delivers the partial private key dA to user IDA through a secret channel. Entity
A can validate her key by verifying that dAP = RA + hAPpub.
3. GenUserKeys: Entity A with an identity IDA chooses xA ∈R Z∗q as its secret
value and generates the corresponding public key as PA = xAP . Furthermore,
entity A sets skA = (xA, dA) as its full private key and pkA = (PA, RA) as its full
public key.
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4. SymmetricKeyGen: Given the sender identity IDA, the receiver identity IDB and
the full public key pkB as input, the sender proceeds as follows:
– Chooses K ∈R {0, 1}lk and x, a ∈R Z∗q ;
– Computes U = aP and X = x(RB +H1(IDB, RB)Ppub + PB);
– Computes (k1, k2) = H2(X + U);
– Outputs K and ω = (x, k1, k2, TS, IDA, IDB, pkB, X, U) where TS is a
suitably defined timestamp.
5. Encapsulation: On input ω, an arbitrary tag τ , the full private key skA, entity A
obtains the encapsulation φ by performing the following computations:
– Computes c = Ek1 (K,TS, τ, IDA, IDB, RA, RB, PA, PB, X, U),
r = Fk2(K,TS, τ, IDA, IDB, RA, RB, PA, PB, X, U)
and s = x/(r + xA) mod q;
– Outputs φ = 〈U, c, r, s〉.
6. Decapsulation: On input the encapsulation φ, tag τ , the sender’s identity IDA,
full public key pkA, the receiver’s identity IDB and the full private key skB , the
recipient entity B performs the following computations:
– Computes X ′ = s(dB + xB)(PA + rP ) and H2(X ′ + U) = (k1, k2);
– Computes K,TS, τ, IDA, IDB, RA, RB, PA, PB, X, U ′ = Dk1(c) and
r′ = Fk2(K,TS, τ, IDA, IDB, RA, RB, PA, PB , X, U
′);
– If TS is not fresh or U 6= U ′ or X ′ 6= X or r′ 6= r, returns with an invalid
encapsulation error ⊥;
– Otherwise, accepts the key K .
The correctness of the protocol is determined as follows:
s(dB + xB)(PA + rP ) = sdB(PA + rP ) + sxB(PA + rP )
= s(xAdBP + rdBP ) + s(xAxBP + rxBP )
= s(xA + r)dBP + s(xA + r)PB
= xdBP + xPB
= x(dBP + PB) = X
6 On the efficiency and security of CLSC-TKEM protocols
In this section we compare four CLSC-TKEM protocols from two perspectives: com-
putational load and security properties. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the computational
cost of the sender and recipient principals respectively. The features that are taken into
account are: a) online and offline exponentiations, the former refer to the operations
that are performed during running instances of the protocols while the later consider
the pre-computation of values that can be performed before protocol execution (this
data must be safely stored in the sender device); b) field inversions (fld inv.); c) field
multiplications (fld mult.) and d) decryption operations with a symmetric cipher.
Table 3 summarizes the security properties of the same CLSC-TKEM protocols
considered above. The security properties that are taken into account are: a) sender par-
tial forward secrecy (sPFS); b) user authentication (sender); c) non repudiation (sender);
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Table 1. Computational efficiency of CLSC-TKEM protocols - sender
Protocol online exp. offline exp. fld inv. fld mult. encryption
CLSC-TKEM[10] 2EM 0EM 0 2 0
eCLSC-TKEM[9] 4EM 2EM 0 0 0
LSW-CLSC-TKEM 3EM 0EM 1 2 0
DKTUTS-CLSC-TKEM 2EM 0EM 1 1 1
Table 2. Computational efficiency of CLSC-TKEM protocols - recipient
Protocol online exp. offline exp. fld inv. fld mult. decryption
CLSC-TKEM[10] 5EM 3EM 0 0 0
eCLSC-TKEM[9] 4EM 2EM 0 0 0
LSW-CLSC-TKEM 3EM 0EM 1 0 0
DKTUTS-CLSC-TKEM 2EM 0EM 0 1 1
d) user revocation; e) security proof, indicates whether a formal security proof exists for
the protocol.
All protocols considered in table 3 do not guarantee forward secrecy (FS). For these
typical one-pass key transport schemes where the recipient does not contribute to the
computation of the session key the appropriate notion is that of partial forward secrecy
(PFS) i.e. if compromise of the long-term keys of one or more specific principals does
not compromise the session keys established in previous protocol runs involving those
principals [13]. In particular, for the protocols we are discussing it makes sense to con-
sider sender partial forward secrecy [4] (respect to a passive adversary that can corrupt
peers to obtain long-term keying material such as the private key and that does not
modify protocol messages in transit through the network).
Table 3. Security properties of CLSC-TKEM protocols
Protocol sPFS user auth. non-repud. user revoc. sec. proof
CLSC-TKEM[10] yes yes yes no yes
eCLSC-TKEM[9] yes yes yes yes yes
LSW-CLSC-TKEM yes yes yes no no
DKTUTS-CLSC-TKEM yes yes yes no no
7 Final remarks
In this paper we have addressed the problem, introduced by [9], of ensuring that drones
can perform secure communications with many different smart objects, such as sensors
and embedded devices. The authors propose a Certificateless Signcryption Tag Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (eCLSC-TKEM) that minimizes the computational load on
the receiving resource-constrained mobile device. We have proposed two constructions
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that achieve better performance in terms of the computational overhead required by the
recipient.
However, resource-constrained devices are often more susceptible to private key ex-
posure therefore forward secrecy (of the recipient) may be indeed a desirable security
property for the above protocols. Depending on the target application, when forward
secrecy is necessary a possible option is to employ two-pass key agreement protocols
at the expense of a greater computational cost for the recipient (the protocols described
in this paper can be modified into equivalent key agreement versions). Another possi-
bility of mitigating the consequences of user corruption by an adversary is to use a key
evolving mechanism so that keys are updated periodically an thus damage is limited to
the period of validity of the exposed key [14].
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